For a large natural class of forcing notions, we prove general equivalence theorems between forcing absoluteness statements, regularity properties, and transcendence properties over L and the core model K. We use our results to answer open questions from set theory of the reals.
Introduction & background
Forcing absoluteness statements have been investigated by Amir, Bagaria, Brendle, Halbeisen, Judah and others [1, 3, 6, 13, 19] . These statements of the form ''Every Γ -statement is absolute between the ground model and its forcing extensions with P'' are typically independent of the axioms of ZFC, and can often be proved to be equivalent to statements about regularity properties. Typical equivalence theorems are: Theorem 1.1 (Bagaria, Woodin, [2, 33] (Ikegami, [15] ). Every [20] ; similarly, Brendle and Löwe showed that the statement ''every 1 2 -set either contains a perfect subset or is disjoint from a perfect set'' is equivalent to ''for all reals x, there is a real not in L[x]'' [8] .
In this paper, we shall prove a general abstract result underlying both Theorems 1.1 and 1.2, by connecting (for a large class of forcings P) 1 3 -P-absoluteness, a regularity property at the 1 2 -level, and a transcendence property related to P. The case of Cohen forcing might suggest that the right transcendence property is the existence of P-generics, but this already fails in the case of Sacks forcing. 1 In order to deal with this situation, Brendle, Halbeisen and Löwe introduced the notion of quasi-generic reals [7] . In many cases of c.c.c. forcings (such as Cohen forcing), the notions of quasi-genericity and genericity coincide; in general, the existence of quasi-generics gives us the right transcendence property for our general theorem. We prove:
Theorem 1.3. For any forcing P in a large class of forcing notions,
2 the following are equivalent:
(1) 1 3 -P-absoluteness holds, (2) every 1 
-set of reals is P-measurable, and (3) for any real a and T ∈ P, there is a quasi-P-generic real x ∈ [T ] over L[a].
We shall start by defining and investigating the basic concepts in Section 2 and Section 3. We then state and prove the main result of the paper (the precise version of Theorem 1.3) and its immediate consequences in Section 4. Among the consequences is a general Solovay-style characterization theorem (in the tradition of [30] ). In Section 5, we move on to 1 4 -absoluteness and prove the analogues of the results from Section 4 under the assumption of appropriate large cardinal axioms. These proofs use some basic facts of inner model theory. In Section 6, we give applications of our main results, answering an open question from [7] ; finally, in Section 7, we list a number of interesting open questions.
Basic concepts
From now on, we will work in ZFC. We assume that readers are familiar with the elementary theories of forcing and descriptive set theory. (For basic definitions not given in this paper, see [16, 26] .) When we are talking about ''reals'', we mean elements of the Baire space or of the Cantor space.
In this section, we introduce the notions we will need for the rest. We start with introducing the forcing absoluteness we will focus on: Definition 2.1 ( 1 n -P-Absoluteness). Let P be a forcing notion and n be a natural number with n ≥ 1. Then 1 n -P-absoluteness is the following statement:
''for any Σ 1 n -formula ϕ, real r in V , and P-generic filter G over V , V ϕ(r) iff V [G] ϕ(r)''.
Definition 2.2 (Projective Forcings).
Let n be a natural number with n ≥ 1. A partial order P is 1 n (resp. n ), where P = (P, ≤ P ) and ⊥ P is the incompatibility relation in P. We say P is projective if it is 1 n for some n ≥ 1. Let n be a natural number with n ≥ 1. A partial order P is provably ∆ 1 n if there is a Σ 1 n -formula φ and a Π 1 n -formula ψ such that the statement ''φ and ψ define the same triple (P, ≤, ⊥)'' is provable in ZFC.
Regularity properties are properties for sets of reals such that sets of reals with such properties can be approximated by some simple sets (e.g. open sets, Borel sets). Typical examples are Lebesgue measurability and the Baire property. All typical forcings related to the known regularity properties are provably 1 2 . In this paper, we are only interested in projective forcings.
In our main results, we shall need a strengthening of the standard notion of properness for projective forcings that is used in [4, Definition 5]: 1 3 forcing which is not strongly proper (for the details, see the papers [5, 4] by Bagaria and Bosch).
We use strong properness instead of properness, as it allows us to leave out the quantification ''∈ H θ '' which would increase the complexity of our statements in the relevant results (Proposition 2.17, Theorems 5.3 and 5.6) beyond projective.
Next, we introduce a class of forcings containing all the well-known forcing notions with perfect trees on ω or on 2 as conditions. A partial order P is arboreal if its conditions are perfect trees on ω (resp. 2) ordered by inclusion. But this class of forcings contains some trivial forcings such as P = { <ω ω}. We need the following stronger notion: Definition 2.4. A partial order P is strongly arboreal if it is arboreal and the following holds:
(∀T ∈ P) (∀t ∈ T ) T t ∈ P,
where T t = {s ∈ T | either s ⊆ t or s ⊇ t}.
With strongly arboreal forcings, we can code generic objects by reals in the standard way: let P be strongly arboreal and 
Then the partial order ({T (n,f ) | (n, f ) ∈ D}, ⊆) is strongly arboreal and equivalent to Hechler forcing. (4) Mathias forcing: for a condition (s, A) of Mathias forcing, let T (s,A) = {t ∈ <ω ω | t is strictly increasing and s ⊆ ran(t) ⊆ s ∪ A}.
is a condition of Mathias forcing} is a strongly arboreal forcing equivalent to Mathias forcing.
(5) Sacks forcing, Silver forcing, Miller forcing, Laver forcing (S, V, M, L, respectively): these forcings can be naturally seen as strongly arboreal forcings.
We now introduce a general definition of a regularity property associated with an arbitrary arboreal forcing. Sets of reals with a regularity property should be approximated by some simple sets (e.g., Borel sets) modulo some ''smallness'' as in the case of the Baire property and Lebesgue measurability. Therefore we first introduce ''smallness'' for each arboreal forcing by defining a σ -ideal as follows: Definition 2.6. Let P be an arboreal forcing. A set of reals A is P-null if for any T in P there is a T ≤ T such that [T ] ∩ A = ∅. N P denotes the set of all P-null sets and I P denotes the σ -ideal generated by P-null sets. 
Hence I D is the meager ideal in the dominating topology. As with Sacks forcing, all the typical non-ccc tree-type forcings admitting a fusion argument satisfy the equation I P = N P . Since I P is Borel generated for any ccc arboreal forcing, the condition ( * * ) in Theorem 4.4 (which we will state in Section 4) holds for all the typical tree-type strongly arboreal forcings. Now we introduce the regularity property for each arboreal forcing:
As we expect, P-measurability coincides with the approximation properties via Borel sets for P in the sense below when P is ccc: Proposition 2.9. Let P be a strongly arboreal ccc forcing and let P be a set of reals. Then P is P-measurable iff there is a Borel set B such that P B ∈ I P .
Proof. The direction from right to left follows from the fact that every Borel set of reals is P-measurable which will be proved in Lemma 3.5.
For the other direction, suppose P is P-measurable and we will find a Borel set approximating P modulo I P . Since P is P-measurable, the set D = {T ∈ P | either [T ] ∩ P ∈ I P or [T ] \ P ∈ I P } is dense. We take a maximal antichain A in D and define B = {[T ] | T ∈ A and [T ] \ P ∈ I P }. Then since A is countable, B is Borel and P B ∈ I P because D is dense.
This argument does not work for non-ccc forcings such as Sacks forcing. 4 But P-measurability is almost the same as the regularity properties for non-ccc forcings P, e.g., for Mathias forcing, a set of reals A is Mathias-measurable iff {ran(x) | x ∈ A ∩ A 0 } is completely Ramsey (or has the Baire property in the Ellentuck topology), where A 0 is the set of 4 For example, assuming every 1 1 -set has the perfect set property, every 1 1 -set of reals has the Bernstein property (i.e., either it contains a perfect or there is a perfect set disjoint from the set) but for a 1 1 -set of reals A, A is approximated by a Borel set modulo I S iff A is Borel. This is because I S restricted to analytic sets (or co-analytic sets) is the set of all countable sets of reals.
all strictly increasing infinite sequences of natural numbers. Also, for Sacks forcing, the following holds: Proof. We will prove only (5). The rest are straightforward. Suppose P satisfies the above condition and let A be in I P * . We prove A is in I P . Since A is in I P * , the set of all T in P such that [T ]∩A ∈ I P is dense in P. Hence we can take a maximal antichain A contained in this set. By the condition, we may assume for any two distinct elements
Since A = n∈ω N n , the proof is complete if we prove the following Claim 2.14. For each n ∈ ω, N n is P-null.
Proof of Claim 2.14. Take any T in P. Since A is a maximal antichain, we can take a T ∈ A such that T and T are compatible. Take a common extension T . Then [T ] ∩ N n = [T ] ∩ N n,T because of the property of A. But we know that N n,T is P-null.
Hence we can take a further extension of T disjoint from N n .
Next, we introduce quasi-P-genericity for arboreal forcings P and compare it with P-genericity. Quasi-generic reals are obvious generalization of Cohen reals and random reals: is absolute between M and V . Therefore, quasi-S-genericity does not coincide with S-genericity.
The last example explains the difference between genericity and quasi-genericity and shows that the equivalence for Sacks forcing we mentioned in the introduction is a special case of Theorem 4.3 which we will prove later. 6 As is expected, genericity implies quasi-genericity for all the typical strongly arboreal forcings and the converse is true for most ccc forcings: Proof. See Section 3.
P-measurability and P-Baireness
In this section, we shall prove the propositions listed in Section 2. In order to do so, we first consider the connection between P-measurability and a property called P-Baireness (which was implicitly introduced by Feng, Magidor and Woodin [12] ). This connection will allow us to characterize I P * in terms of Banach-Mazur games, which plays an essential role in the proof of Proposition 2.17.
Let P be a partial order. The Stone space of P (denoted by St(P)) is the set of ultrafilters of P equipped with the topology
For example, if P is Cohen forcing (C), then St(C) is homeomorphic to the Baire space ω ω. Dense sets in P are the same as open dense subsets in St(P): if D is a dense subset of P, then the set
Next, we will talk about meagerness and the Baire property in St(P). The first observation we should make is that this is not nonsense: Lemma 3.1. Let P be a partial order. Then for any p ∈ St(P), O p is not meager. Proof. Take any p ∈ P and let {U n | n ∈ ω} be a countable set of open dense subsets of St(P). We would like to prove that the intersection n∈ω U n with O p is nonempty. But this is just the Rasiowa-Sikorsky Theorem.
Before defining P-Baireness, let us see the connection between Baire measurable functions from St(P) to the reals and P-names for a real. There is a natural correspondence between Baire measurable functions from St(P) to the reals and P-names for a real:
Lemma 3.2 (Feng-Magidor-Woodin) . Let P be a partial order.
is a P-name for a real.
(2) Let τ be a P-name for a real. Define f τ as follows. For u ∈ St(P) and m, n ∈ ω,
Then the domain of f τ is comeager in St(P) and f τ is continuous on the domain. Hence it can be uniquely extended to a Baire measurable function from St(P) to the reals modulo meager sets.
Proof. See [12, Theorem 3.2] .
Recall that we have defined a generic real x G from a generic object G for any strongly arboreal forcing P. Letẋ G be a canonical P-name for x G .
Now we define the property P-Baireness. Let P be a partial order and A be a set of reals. Then A is P-Baire if for any Baire measurable function f : St(P) → ω ω, f −1 (A) has the Baire property in St(P). It is easy to see that every Borel set of reals is P-Baire for any P by the same argument as for the Baire property. 
<ω 2) to generate the dense subalgebra C of the completion of P, then Zapletal's I is exactly the same as our I P * on Borel sets.
Example 3.4. Let C be Cohen forcing. A set of reals A is C-Baire iff f −1 (A) has the Baire property for any continuous function f :
ω ω → ω ω.
Proof. As we have remarked in the beginning of this section, St(C) is homeomorphic to the Baire space ω ω. In the Baire space, any G δ comeager set is homeomorphic to the whole space. Hence we can replace Baire measurable functions by continuous functions in the definition of C-Baireness.
Before talking about the relation between P-measurability and P-Baireness, let us mention the connection between P-Baireness and universally Baireness. A set of reals A is universally Baire if for any compact Hausdorff space X and any continuous function f : X → ω ω, f −1 (A) has the Baire property in X . A set of reals A is universally Baire iff A is P-Baire for any partial order P. (This is essentially proved in [12] .) Recall that I P * is a technical ideal introduced in Definition 2.11 which is the same as I P for most cases.
Lemma 3.5 (P-measurability vs. P-Baireness). Let P be a strongly arboreal, proper forcing and A be a set of reals. Then
is meager in St(P), and
Borel set is P-measurable.
Note that P-measurability does not imply P-Baireness in general.
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Proof of Lemma 3.5. Let π = fẋ G for abuse of notation.
The following are useful for the proof:
converse of (a) holds for comeager many u in dom(π ).
Proof of Claim 3.6. (a) Suppose T ∈ u. We prove π(u) n ∈ T for each n ∈ ω. Fix a natural number n. Then by Example 3.3, there is a T in u such that stem(T ) ⊇ π (u) n. Since both T and T are in u, they are compatible, especially stem(
(1) We prove the direction from left to right.
We first show that π
Hence the set of all u ∈ dom(π ) with u ∩ D = ∅ is comeager. But if u is in the comeager set, then there is a T ∈ u ∩ D and by Claim 3.6(a), π (u) ∈ [T ] and [T ] ∩ A = ∅, in particular π(u) / ∈ A. Therefore π −1 (A) is meager. We have seen that π −1 (A) is meager assuming A is in N P . Since I P is the σ -ideal generated by sets in 
is meager as desired. Next, we see the direction from right to left. Suppose π −1 (A) is meager. Take any T in P and we will find an extension
We choose a sequence A n | n ∈ ω of maximal antichains such that A n ⊆ D n , for each element S of A n , the length of stem(S) is greater than n, and A n+1 refines A n , i.e., every element of A n+1 is below some element in A n . Now we use the properness of P to treat each A n as ''countable''. Let θ be a sufficiently large regular cardinal and X be a countable elementary substructure of H θ such that P, T , A n | n ∈ ω are in X . By properness, there is an (X, P)-generic condition T below T . We show that [T ] ∩ A is in I P , which will complete the proof of (1).
Consider
So B is the set of all x uniquely deciding which condition from A n contains it for each n. By the property of A n | n ∈ ω , it will generate a filter coming from elements in the A n . The point is that any ultrafilter u extending that filter satisfies π (u) = x, the given element, and that u is in U n for each n. This will play a role for the argument. Now we claim [T ] \ B ∈ I P and B ∩ A = ∅. We will be done if we prove this. The fact that [T ] \ B ∈ I P follows from the fact that {S | S ∈ A n ∩ X } is predense below [T ] for each n because T is (X, P)-generic and from that [S] ∩ [S ] ∈ I P for each S, S ∈ A n ∩ X with S = S because A n is an antichain, and from that A n ∩ X is countable for each n.
To prove B ∩ A = ∅, take any element x from B. As we mentioned above, for each n ∈ ω, there is a unique element S n in A n ∩ X with x ∈ [S n ]. Since A n+1 refines A n , S n+1 ≤ S n for each n. Hence the set {S n | n ∈ ω} generate a filter F x . Take any ultrafilter u extending F x . We claim that π (u) = x and u ∈ U n for each n. By the property of A n | n ∈ ω , the length of stem(S n ) is greater than n. Hence, by Example 3.3, π (u) is already decided to be x by the S n . The fact that u ∈ U n for each n follows from the fact that S n ∈ A n ⊆ D n and the definition of D n .
Since we have assumed that n∈ω U n ∩π −1 (A) = ∅, x does not belong to A because x = π (u) ∈ U n for each n by Claim 3.6. Hence we have seen B ∩ A = ∅ as desired.
(2) For left to right, we assume A is P-measurable. Then the set
By Lemma 2.13(1), Lemma 3.1, Claim 3.6(a), and (1) in this lemma, U 1 ∩ U 2 = ∅. Hence, it suffices to show that
is meager by Claim 3.6(a), Lemma 2.13(1), and (1) in this lemma. Hence we are done.
Now we see the direction from right to left. Assume π −1 (A) has the Baire property in St(P).
Then there are open sets U 1 ,
meager. This completes the proof of (2).
Note that if P satisfies the condition in Lemma 2.13(5), then we do not need the properness of P for the proof of Lemma 3. 
It is clear that if
To show the converse, assume T 1 T 2 and we prove that i(T 1 ) i(T 2 ).
Since T 1 T 2 , there is a t ∈ T 1 which is not in T 2 . By strong arborealness of P, (T 1 ) t ∈ P and [(
So it suffices to see that i''P is dense in B/I P * \ {0}. Let B be a Borel set which is not in I P * . We will find a T in P with
[T ] \ B ∈ I P * .
Since every Borel set is P-Baire, by Lemma 3.5 (2), B is P-measurable. Since B is not in I P * , there is a T such that [T ]\B ∈ I P , hence [T ] \ B ∈ I P * by Lemma 2.13 (1), as desired.
Proof of Proposition 2.17.
(1) Let π = fẋ G be as in the proof of Lemma 3.5. By Lemma 3.5, a set of reals A is in I P * , iff π −1 (A) is meager in St(P). Hence, it suffices to show that {c | π −1 (B c ) is meager} ∈ 1 2 . We will prove the following:
To be rigorous, M is a model of a large enough fragment of ZFC as noted in the footnote in Definition 2.3. First note that the right hand side makes sense because the statement ''P is a strongly arboreal forcing'' is 1 2 by the assumption that P is provably 
Proof of Claim 3.8. Take any T in P M . Since P is provably 1 2 , P M , ≤ M and ⊥ M are subsets of P, ≤ and ⊥ respectively. Hence, by strong properness, there is a T ≤ T such that T is (M, P)-generic.
We will show that T satisfies the desired property. For that, we will use the unfolded Banach-Mazur game. Let U be a tree on ω × ω, recursive in c such that B c = p[U] holds in any transitive model of ZFC N with c ∈ N. Consider the following game G : player I and II produce a decreasing sequence S n ≤ T | n ∈ ω one by one and in addition, player II produces a real y n | n ∈ ω . Player II wins if (π (u), y) ∈ [U] for any u ∈ n∈ω O S n . Note that we may assume that π is defined for any u ∈ n∈ω O S n and the value of π only depends on the sequence S n | n ∈ ω because we can arrange π(u) = n∈ω stem(S n ) by strong arborealness of P and Example 3.3.
By the well-known characterization of meagerness for the topological space O T via Banach-Mazur games, it suffices to show that player II has a winning strategy in the game
a winning strategy for player II in G in V . Instead of writing down a winning strategy for player II in G , we will describe how to win the game G for player II as follows:
We will construct sequences S n | n ∈ ω , S n | n ∈ ω , y n | n ∈ ω with the following properties:
• S 2n is arbitrarily chosen by player I for each n,
• player II follows σ in G M , and
Assuming we have constructed the above sequences, we prove that player II wins in the game G . First note that G M is a closed game for player II, hence the strategy σ remains winning in
for any u ∈ n∈ω O S n , hence player II wins the game G . We describe how to construct the above sequences. Suppose we have got (S i , S i , y i ) | i < 2n for some n. We will decide S 2n , S 2n+1 , S 2n , S 2n+1 and y n . By the above properties, S 2n is arbitrarily chosen by player I and S 2n+1 , y n will be decided by the rest and σ . So let us decide S 2n and S 2n+1 . Let D be the set of all possible candidates for S 2n+1 by σ and the previous play
Take an element from D which is compatible with S 2n and choose S 2n so that the element we have taken becomes S 2n+1 by σ and let S 2n+1 be a common extension (in V ) of S 2n and S 2n+1 . This finishes the construction of the sequences. 
We show that x / ∈ B c when c is a Borel code in M with B c ∈ I P * .
Let c be such a Borel code. By (1) and the downward absoluteness for 
We first see that G x meets every maximal antichain of
Then B is a Borel set with a code in M and M '' ω ω\B ∈ I P * ''.
By (1) , this is also true in V . Since x is quasi-P-generic over M, x / ∈ B c , i.e., x is in B. So G x meets A.
Now we see that G x is a filter. Take any two elements T 1 , T 2 in G x . We will find a common extension of
There is a close connection between forcing absoluteness for P and P-Baireness. The author would like to thank Neus Castells for telling him about the following theorem: Theorem 3.9 (Castells). Let P be a partial order. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) 
1 3 -absoluteness
Now we give a precise statement of Theorem 1.3 and prove it. Also we will prove related results. 
is meager} is dense in P. So take any T in P and we will find an extension S of T with the above property. By the above claim, there is a T ≤ T and a Borel function g :
, where τ f is the P-name for a real defined in Lemma 3.2(1). Hence, by Lemma 3.
, it is P-measurable by the assumption. By Lemma 3.5(2), f 
( * )
Then the following are equivalent: 
-set of reals is P-measurable, and (3) for any real a and T ∈ P, there is a quasi-P-generic real x ∈ [T ] over L[a].
Proof. We have seen the equivalence between (1) and (2). We will show the direction from (1) to (3) and the direction from (3) to (2).
For (1) implies (3), take a real a and T in P. We will find a quasi-P-generic real x over L For (3) implies (2), take any 1 2 -set A and we will show that A is P-measurable. Take any T in P.
transitive model of ZFC computing P correctly. Hence by strong properness of P, there is an (M, P)-generic condition T below T . Then any dense subset of P in M is predense below T and the set of all P-generic reals over M is of measure one w.r.t.
I P below T , (i.e., the complement of that set intersected with [T ] is in I P ). By the property of M, this means that the set of all P-generic reals over M is of measure one w.r.t. I P below T . The rest is a standard Solovay argument to prove regularity properties in Solovay models. (Actually, every 
and I P is Borel generated or I P = N P .
( * * )
Then the following are equivalent:
(1) every 1 2 -set of reals is P-measurable, and
Proof. For (1) implies (2), take any real a and we show that A = {x | x is quasi-P-generic over L[a]} is of measure one w.r.t. (1), it is P-measurable. Hence there is a T in
We show that this cannot happen.
Case 1: I P is Borel generated, i.e., for any N in I P there is a Borel set B ∈ I P such that N ⊆ B. 
1 4 -absoluteness
It is natural to try to generalize the equivalence results proved in Section 4 up to the ones between 1 4 -forcing absoluteness and the regularity properties for 1 3 -sets of reals and 1 3 -sets of reals. But these analogues cannot be proved in ZFC. 9 In this section, with an additional assumption (sharps for sets), we will prove the analogues of the results in Section 4. We use inner model theory for some arguments. For the basics of inner model theory, the reader can consult [36, 25, 32] . Theorem 5.1. Let P be a strongly arboreal proper forcing. Suppose every set has a sharp. 10 Then either (2), the argument is the same as for (1) implies (2) in [12, Theorem 3.1]. What we should check is that we get the absolute tree representation for 10 For the basic definitions and theories for sharps, the reader can refer to [21] and [10] .
11 Martin and Solovay [24] constructed so-called Martin-Solovay trees assuming a measurable cardinal when they proved all the 1 3 -formulas are absolute between the ground model and small generic extensions. For the details, the reader can refer to [21] .
of Martin-Solovay trees between V and V P . 12 But this is true assuming every set has a sharp and P being proper by [29, Theorem 2.1.9, Example 3.2.7].
For (2) implies (1), first note that we may assume that every 1 3 -set is P-Baire by the same argument for (2) implies (1) in Theorem 4.1. The argument is the same as for in [12, Theorem 3.1] . What we need is to uniformize a Proof. The reader who is not familiar with inner model theory may skip this proof and take the above statement as a black box.
It suffices to show that every 14 In this case, by the result of Steel [32] , there is a real a 0 such that the Mitchell-Steel core model K a exists and that K a is 1 3 -correct for any a ≥ T a 0 , where ≤ T is the Turing order on the reals. 15, 16 For each a ≥ T a 0 , let < a be the canonical good Then there is a real a 1 such that for any real a ≥ T a 1 , a Ď does not exist. By the result of Dodd-Jensen in [11] , the DoddJensen core model K a exists and it enjoys the same properties as the Mitchell-Steel core model mentioned above for any a ≥ T a 1 . 17 The rest is the same as Case 1. Proof. In Theorem 5.1, we have seen the equivalence between (1) and (2) . We show the direction from (1) to (3) and the one from (3) to (2).
For (1) implies (3), all we need is that the statement ''there is a quasi-P-generic real x over K a with x ∈ [T ]'' is 1 4 for each real a and each T ∈ P. But this is true by Proposition 2.17(1) and the fact that the set of reals in K a is 1 3 (a) in V . 15 The argument for (3) to (2) is basically the same as the one in Theorem 4.3. Assume 1 2 -determinacy fails. Then there is a real a such that there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal containing a. 18 For simplicity, we assume that there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal. The general case can be dealt with in the same way. 12 The second uniform indiscernible u 2 is the second element of x∈R I x , where I x is the indiscernible sequence over L [x] derived from x # . For the details, the reader can consult [21] . 13 Since [18, 17] constructed the core model K without using measurable cardinals.) For the details, see [27] . 17 For the basics of the Dodd-Jensen core model, the reader can consult [11] . Proof. Here we heavily use the machinery of inner model theory. All the definitions and theorems we will use without any mention can be found in [36] . The reader who is not familiar with inner model theory may skip this proof and take the above statement as a black box.
For simplicity, we only prove ω
To derive a contradiction, we assume ω
The following is the first point: By the same argument, we can prove that K a |ω 1 is universal for countable a-mice for each real a. We now have two cases: and linearly iterate it with the lower measure in a Ď with length ω 1 . Then the height of the last model is bigger than u
. Now we restrict this linear iteration map to K in a Ď constructed up to the point with the top measure. The point is this is an iteration map on it and the final model of this iteration has height bigger than u
Since it is a countable mouse, by Claim 5.5, we get a countable mouse in K with the same property, which yields a contradiction by a standard boundedness argument.
We will discuss this idea in detail. Let i be the linear iteration map of a Ď derived from the iterated ultrapower starting from the lower measure in it with length ω 1 . Then the target N of i has height bigger than u |Ω is a mouse and we call it M.
We claim that if we restrict i to M, then it is an iteration map on M. Since i is from a linear iteration of ultrapowers via measures, by applying the result of Schindler [28] in each ultrapower in the iteration, we can prove that the restriction of i to M is an iteration with length ω 1 (which itself might be quite complicated). Moreover, the final model of this iteration has height greater than u We will construct (1) The diagrams below all commute,
for each α, (3) N α is the direct limit of N β (β < α) for limit α, and (4) i U α,α+1 and π α+1 are the resulted maps by the comparison between N α and M α+1 for each α.
The above properties uniquely specify
Hence it suffices to check (1) and (2) Since K|α 0 is in K and α 0 is countable in K, there is a real x in K coding K|α 0 . We show that the height of N ω 1 is less than (ω
. Since K |α 0 is coded by x and the length of iteration is ω V 1 which is countable witnessed by g, by the boundedness lemma in Proof. The argument is exactly the same as Theorem 4.4 by replacing L[a] by K a and using the analogous facts about K a we have already stated.
Applications
In this section, we mention two applications of our theorems to particular cases. One will be proved here and the other is in [9] .
The first one is about Silver forcing. The conditions of Silver forcings are uniform perfect trees on 2 where a tree on 2 is uniform if for any s, t ∈ T of the same length, we have s 0 ∈ T ⇐⇒ t 0 ∈ T and s 1 ∈ T ⇐⇒ t 1 ∈ T . The order of Silver forcing is inclusion. It is easy to check that Silver forcing is strongly arboreal and strongly proper. Hence we can talk about the regularity property for Silver forcing as defined in Section 2.
Brendle, Halbeisen and Löwe [7] proved the following: 
With the above fact, this means every Borel set is either in I or contains [T ] for some T ∈ V. Hence B c ∈ I V * iff B c is in I, i.e., it is the union of a countable set of G-invariant Borel sets. This is easily Another application is for eventually different forcing by Brendle-Löwe [9] . They used Theorem 4.4 to prove that the Baire property in eventually different topology for every 1 2 -set of reals is equivalent to the statement ''ω 1 is inaccessible by reals''. For the basic definitions and properties for eventually different forcing and its topology, the reader can consult [23] .
Questions and discussions
We close this paper by raising questions and discussing them.
On I P and I P *
Although I P * is the same as I P for most cases as we have seen in Lemma 2.13, as in Question 2.12, we still do not know whether this is true in general. What we could wish is that this is true at least for Borel sets: Question 7.1. Let P be a strongly arboreal, proper forcing. Then can we prove B ∈ I P iff B ∈ I P * for any Borel set B?
If this is true, we do not have to mention I P * in our theorems.
On the condition ( * ) in Theorem 4.3
It is interesting to give sufficient conditions for P satisfying ( * ) in Theorem 4.3, i.e., the set of all Borel codes with B c ∈ I P * is 1 2 . These conditions could be definability conditions on I P * or directly on P.
For the first case, we have a useful sufficient condition: we say that a σ -ideal I on the reals is it is enough to see whether 
Sharps for sets vs sharps for reals
In Theorems 5.1, 5.3 and 5.6, we have assumed the existence of sharps for sets. It is natural to ask whether we can reduce this assumption to sharps for reals. The obstacle is whether proper forcings preserve the statement ''every real has a sharp'' and u 2 : Question 7.4. Suppose every real has a sharp. Let P be a strongly arboreal, proper, provably We only show the first equivalence. For left to right, if we take a countable elementary substructure X of H θ for enough large θ such that X has all the essential elements, then the transitive collapse of X will do the job for M in the right hand side. For right to left, take an M with the property in the right hand side. The idea is the same as the proof of Claim 3.8 in Lemma 2.17 (1) . This time, we use G, the Banach-Mazur game with a witness for π −1 (B c ) starting from any element of P, both in M and V and translate a winning strategy in G M to the one in G.
By the assumption, in M, player II has a winning strategy σ in G. The construction of a winning strategy for II in G in V from σ is exactly the same as Claim 3.8. But instead of using the (M, P)-genericity for a condition T , we use the following: 
